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A commentary on
Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception, inference, and the roles of mirror
and mentalizing systems
by Catmur, C. (2015). Conscious Cogn. 36, 426–433. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.03.012
Action perception, i.e., our ability to discriminate what action is performed and how, may underpin
intention understanding (why an actor performed the observed action). Clearly, contextual cues
do play a role in intention understanding but a crucial question is whether we are able to
infer intentions by merely looking at actions (see Csibra and Gergely, 2007) and whether this
function needs the activity of our motor system. In this commentary, we contend that (i) action
discrimination is fundamental for intention understanding, (ii) this function needs the activity of
the motor node of the AON, and (iii) further studies applying a causative approach to investigate
the neural underpinnings of action discrimination and intention understanding are needed.
Imagine observing amime actor. His intentions (beside that of entertaining us) are realized through
pantomimed actions and we need to discriminate how he grasps and manipulates imagined objects
in order to understand his intentions.
In a recent article Catmur (2015) raised important questions about the role of the action
observation network (AON) in the human ability to read others’ mind. The author argued that
the AON may support inferential processing providing sensorimotor information to mentalizing
brain areas in order to make correct inferences about other’s intentions, but that activity in the
AON cannot fully account for our ability to understand others’ intention. Catmur proposes a set of
conditions that action observation neural responses should meet in order to determine the causal
contribution of the AON in intention understanding. Namely: (1) the sight of an action must
activate only one, matching, motor program in the observer; (2) this motor program must have
a one-to-one mapping with the observer’s own intention; (3) this mapping from motor program to
intention must be the same in the observer as in the actor; and (4) upon activation of the motor
program, the associated intention must be automatically activated, without the involvement of any
higher-level inferential processes.
The first point relates to the functional connections between the visual and the motor system
(Cattaneo et al., 2010; D’Ausilio et al., 2015), i.e., to what extent is our visual system able to
discriminate between slightly different movements and whether this sensitivity is reflected in the
activations of different patterns in the premotor counterpart of the AON (e.g., strictly or broadly
congruent mirror neurons). In this respect it is important to note that causal studies have shown
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that interference/lesion with premotor regions impairs posture
discrimination (Urgesi et al., 2007; Candidi et al., 2008; Moro
et al., 2008).
The latter three points regard the functional relation
between motor programs, inferential processes and the neural
underpinnings of intention understanding. First we note that we
are never able to produce exactly the same movement although
we “select” the same motor program to realize one intention:
i.e., there is no one-to-one mapping of intentions into motor
programs. The third condition, we believe, should better leave
some space for the natural variability in the ability to understand
others’ intentions by looking at their behavior: an intention
may be implemented with different motor programs and two
(or more) observers with different visuo-motor sensitivities
may infer different intentions. The fourth point relates to
the neural underpinnings of the processes. Whether action
perception and intention understanding are carried out by the
AON and Mentalizing areas separately is difficult to proof
and the most reasonable answer is that (at least) the two
systems work together. For example, contextual cues may help
us generating an hypothesis about another person’s intention
(possibly requiring the activation of the Mentalizing network).
However the accuracy of our hypothesis might be tested through
the activity of the AON making us able to discriminate the
observed actions.
The strongest evidence (although not to be considered
conclusive, see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008) of a causal
role of the AON for action discrimination comes from brain
damaged patients (Urgesi et al., 2014) and brain stimulation
interferential (e.g., TMS) studies (Avenanti et al., 2013). Crucially,
the need for adequate control stimuli and control tasks (Press
and Cook, 2015), and the necessity to have control sites of
stimulation is becoming more and more recognized in the field
as the understanding of the neural effects of brain stimulation
techniques increases (Miniussi and Ruzzoli, 2013; Bestmann
et al., 2015; Parkin et al., 2015).
Here we describe the contribution of one study applying
some of the crucial controls that need to be implemented in
experiments aimed at clarifying the contribution of fronto-
parietal regions in action perception and actor’s intentions
understanding: namely, control tasks and sites of stimulation.
In a series of TMS studies participants were asked to detect
an actor’s intention by observing truthful and deceitful actions
characterized by slightly different movement kinematics (Tidoni
et al., 2013). Here intention understanding pertains to the ability
to infer the internal state of the actor based on the observation
of his movements’ kinematics. MEPs recorded from the observer
during the observation of truthful and deceptive intentions
showed a high degree of muscle specificity and a dynamic
mapping of the observed actions’ kinematics (Experiment 1).
Crucially, by adopting an inhibitory repetitive-TMS approach
the authors tested the role of the inferior frontal gyrus (part
of the AON, Experiment 2 and 3) and the temporo-parietal
junctions (part of the mentalizing network, Experiment 2) in the
left hemisphere during an intention detection task. The results
showed a reduced ability to discriminate between the two intents
only when repetitive-TMS was applied over IFG and not when
it was applied over TPJ. Importantly, the fact that no difference
in participants’ ability to discriminate visual stimuli was found in
a difficulty-matched control task (Experiment 2 and 3) allowed
the authors to exclude that the results were driven by a general
inability to decode action-related visuo-spatial features (Press
and Cook, 2015).
In conclusion, we agree with Catmur’s suggestion that more
causal evidences about the role of the AON and mentalizing
system are necessary and we believe that novel methods of
brain stimulation and the use of adequate control elements
(e.g., brain areas, tasks) in future studies may greatly expand
our understanding of the functional roles of these networks
in the processing of action kinematics, goals and intentions
understanding.
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